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JURISDICTION 
This matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(4). This Court has Jurisdiction to decide 
appellants' appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0"). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Issue: Did the trial court err in awarding attorney fees to the interveners, 
who joined the litigation to set aside a judgment of permanent injunction against the 
Defendant, Interstate Transfer Co., and not a restraining order or preliminary injunction, 
that was premised in any way upon UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A? 
Standard of Review: Whether attorney fees should be awarded is 
a legal issue that we review for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 
305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
2. Issue: Did the fees awarded by the trial court improperly include fees that 
interveners would have incurred in litigating the underlying case? 
Standard of Review: Whether fees are recoverable under UTAH R. 
CIV. P. 65A is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Ikon Office Solutions 
v. Crook, 2000 UT App. 217, fl 9, 6 P.3d 1143. 
3. Issue: Did the trial court err in determining the reasonableness of 
attorney fees as a matter of law, without an evidentiary hearing, when there was 
conflicting evidence? 
Standard of Review: The standard of review for a summary 
judgment is correction of error. "Because summary judgment is granted as a 
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matter of law rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise the trial 
court's legal conclusions. The appellate court reviews those conclusions for 
correctness, without according deference to the trial court." Brown v. Weis, 871 
P.2d 552, 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(c), Defenses: 
Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are 
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may 
move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment 
on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to 
and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one 
for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 52(a), Findings by the court: 
Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its action. 
Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. The findings of a master, to the extent 
that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of 
the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions 
of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the 
close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as 
provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
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motion is based on more than one ground. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 54, Judgment; costs: 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a 
judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the 
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, 
even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. It 
may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it 
may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among 
themselves. 
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not 
be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically 
prayed for in the demand for judgment. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c), Summary Judgment: 
Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda 
and affidavits shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 
4-501. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory 
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c)(2): 
Amount not a limitation. The amount of security shall not establish or limit 
the amount of costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
connection with the restraining order or preliminary injunction, or damages 
that may be awarded to a party who is found to have been wrongfully 
restrained or enjoined. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal is from the final judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
dismissing the original proceeding, without prejudice, but awarding attorney fees. The 
propriety of the dismissal is not appealed, the fee award is. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Plaintiff brought this action to enjoin the transfer of certain shares of stock and 
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings concurrently with the filing of the complaint. 
The allegations of the complaint were generally admitted by defendant, Interstate 
Transfer Co. ("Interstate"), and Interstate stipulated to entry of judgment on the 
pleadings. 
On June 28, 2000, the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the 
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, effectively terminating the litigation 
between plaintiff and Interstate. Thereafter, plaintiff and Interstate consented to 
intervention by Brett Phillips, E. Carl Anderson, William H . Morris, Marilyn Morris, and 
Barbara Larkins ("Interveners"), who then filed an emergency motion to dissolve the 
injunction previously entered by the trial court. 
The trial court dissolved the injunction created in its prior judgment, dismissed 
the case, with prejudice, and thereafter awarded the Interveners attorney fees pursuant 
to UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A. 
C. Disposition By Trial Court. 
The underlying case was dismissed without prejudice by the trial court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 6, 2000, Plaintiff Medisys Technologies, Inc. ("Medisys"), an 
issuer of publically-traded securities, by and through its original counsel herein, Richard 
J. Leedy, filed a complaint in the Third Judicial District Court, seeking a permanent 
injunction to prevent its transfer agent, Defendant Interstate Transfer Co., from 
registering the transfer of certain Medisys stock, represented by certificates issued in an 
alleged corporate reorganization, that Medisys alleged had been cancelled. See 
Verified Complaint, R. 1-6, at ffif 2, 12, 14. In its prayer for relief, Medisys requested 
that the trial court "enjoin Defendant [Interstate Transfer Co.] from transferring Medisys 
Technologies, Inc. stock in certificates numbered 2986, 3366, 3364, 2984 and all 
certificates issued after this certificate, #2985, 3462, 3365, 3744, 3746, 3747, 
3748,3749 until further order by this or another court of competent jurisdiction." R. 4. 
2. Medisys, in its Verified Complaint, advised the trial court that it already 
had litigation pending, in a separate federal action, against the putative owners of the 
cancelled shares, who were not parties to this litigation. See Verified Complaint, at fi 
11, R. 3. 
3. Medisys, in its Verified Complaint, advised the trial court that its transfer 
agent, the Defendant, Interstate Transfer Co., had "indicated its intent to require 
Plaintiff to comply with 70A-8-405 Utah Code Ann. [sic] and obtain legal process as set 
forth in Subsection 2(b)(iii) of the above cited section and a court order as set forth in 
Subsection 4(a) thereof." Verified Complaint, at fl 15, R. 4. 
4. Medisys, in its Verified Complaint, advised the trial court that it sought an 
order that would have no "res adjudicata effect on present holders of the Medisys 
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certificates and shares." Verified Complaint, at U 17, R. 4. 
5. In keeping with the alleged fact that it was Defendant Interstate Transfer 
Co. which desired Medisys to procure an order under UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-8-
403(4)(a), Defendant filed its Answer on June 6, 2000, the same day the Verified 
Complaint was filed, admitting all material allegations of the Verified Complaint. See 
Answer, R. 9-11. 
6. The same day that the Verified Complaint and the Answer were filed, 
June 6, 2000, Medisys also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(c). R. 12-13. 
7. Again in keeping with Defendant Interstate Transfer Co.'s own desire to 
be protected by Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-403(4)(a), Defendant filed, again on June 6, 
2000, the date the Verified Complaint and Answer were filed, its "Response to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings," R. 14-15, stating that the motion for judgment 
on the pleadings was not opposed by Defendant, Interstate Transfer Co. R. 14-15. 
8. On June 28, 2000, the trial court ruled on the pending motion for judgment 
on the pleadings and, pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(c), entered its final judgment 
under UTAH R. CIV. P. 54(c)(1), granting Medisys precisely and fully the relief it prayed 
for in the Verified Complaint, in the form of the trial court's "Injunction and Order." R. 
62-63. 
9. The trial court specifically granted the requested relief "[bjased upon the 
Plaintiffs Verified Complaint, Defendant's Answer, Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on 
the Pleadings and Defendant's consent to entry of this order [underlined phrase added 
by hand of the Court.]" Based thereon, the trial court held: 
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It is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Interstate Transfer 
Co . is enjoined from transferring shares of stock in the Medisys 
Technologies, Inc. certificates numbered 2986, 3366, 3364, 2984 
and all certificates issued after this certificate, #2985, 3462, 3365, 
3744, 3746, 3747, 3748, 3749. 
R. 62. The litigation between the then-existing parties, Medisys and Interstate Transfer 
Co., thus ended with that judgment, on June 28, 2000. 
10. According to the record herein, on July 3, 2000, Medisys and Interstate 
Transfer Co. consented to intervention by Brett Phillips, E. Carl Anderson, William H . 
Morris, Marilyn Morris, and Barbara Larkins ("Interveners") on July 3, 2000. See R. 20-
21. 
11. On July 28, 2000, Interveners filed an "Emergency Motion to Dissolve Ex 
Parte Injunction." R. 23. Although the motion itself does not identify its procedural 
basis, the "Memorandum of Defendant Interveners in Support of Emergency Motion to 
Dissolve Injunction, [hereinafter Interveners' Mem.']" filed the same date as the motion, 
specifically asserts in the heading for all of their arguments: "The Injunction is a Sub 
Rosa Restraining Order Against the Interveners, Was Wrongly Issued Without Any of 
the Safeguards Demanded by UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A, and Should Be Immediately 
Dissolved." Interveners' Mem. at 6, R. 128. 
12. Interveners did not invoke, for their procedural standing, any portion of 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b), to set aside Medisys' final judgment, but instead asserted only 
irregularities under UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A, governing preliminary injunctive relief that was 
neither sought nor obtained in the case. See Interveners' Mem., passim, R. 120-138, 
and "Memorandum In Response To Motion to Dissolve Injunction," at 2 ("Proposed 
interveners complain that the injunction did not expire within ten days or that the 
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requirements of Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, including the standards 
advocated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and adopted by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Rule 65A and in particular subsection (e) thereof were not followed. Proposed 
interveners fail to understand that the injunction and order in this case is a result of a 
judgment on the pleadings and is permanent. The provisions argued by proposed 
interveners are for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders; not 
permanent injunctions. See Rule 65A, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and subsection 
(e) thereof."), R. 151. 
13. Interveners also filed an "Answer in Intervention," R. 109-112, on July 28, 
2000. In that answer, Interveners raised the affirmative defense that: "This lawsuit 
should be dismissed in favor of prior pending actions between the Interveners and 
Medisys." R. 112. 
14. On August 18, 2000, the trial court entered its order dissolving the 
injunction on the basis of that defense: "This Court believes that the issue of fraud 
should be decided by one court and that court should be the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. . . . In this regard it is hereby ordered that the 
permanent injunction issued by this Court on June 20, 2000 is hereby dissolved." R. 
223. 
15. On September 11, 2000, the trial court entered an order providing that 
"[t]he Injunction will automatically and permanently dissolve on Tuesday, August 22, 
2000 at 5:01 p .m., without need of any further Court action." R. 238-39. 
16. On October 27, 2000, Interveners filed their "Motion of Defendant 
Interveners For An Award of Fees." R. 391 The motion itself does not identify the 
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procedural basis on which it is brought, but that basis is identified in the "Memorandum 
of Defendant Interveners in Support of an Award of Fees." R. 310-20. Interveners 
requested an award of $30,846.00 in attorneys' fees on grounds that they were 
"wrongfully enjoined" and thus entitled to fees pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c)(2). 
SeeR. 315-19, 391. 
17. The trial court awarded interveners all of their requested fees, including 
fees that they would have incurred in the underlying litigation. See Minute Entry, signed 
by the Honorable Ronald E. Nearing on April 2, 2001, entered April 3, 2001, R. 475-76. 
18. The trial court made its fee awards without an evidentiary hearing, despite 
having received a controverting affidavit from Medisys' counsel, Michael D. Ward, R. 
437-41, and, as to supplemental fees sought (for obtaining fees), an expert witness, 
John T. Anderson, opining as to the unreasonableness of the fees sought. See 
Affidavit of John T. Anderson, R. 514-18. 
19. The trial court entered no findings of fact concerning the reasonableness 
of particular portions of the fees requested and no findings as to why the fees sought 
and obtained by Interveners would not have been incurred in litigation of the underlying 
merits of the Verified Complaint. See R 475-76. 
20. In its Minute Entry of June 18, 2001, the trial court expressly held that 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A authorized its entire fee award, including fees to obtain fees. See 
R. 535. 
21. On February 5, 2002, the trial court entered its order awarding Interveners 
$36,321.80 in fees under UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A. See R. 557-58. 
22. The final order dismissing the case without prejudice, on "the grounds that 
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there is a concurrent pending action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah involving similar parties and claims[,]" was entered by the trial court on December 
1, 2003, R. 684-85, and this appeal of the attorney fee award followed, on December 
31,2003. R. 687-99. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The entry of the original injunction in this case was pursuant to a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings under UTAH R. CIV. P. 12(c) and was entered as a final 
judgment under Rule 54(c). As such, no basis for attorney fees exists and the trial 
court erred in awarding fees under the rule on preliminary injunctions, UTAH R. CIV. P. 
65A. Even if Rule 65A were applicable, however, (1) the Interveners do not have 
standing under the Rule to seek an award of fees because they were not enjoined or 
restrained; (2) the trial court made no effort to exclude from its award fees that would 
have been incurred in litigating the underlying merits; (3) controverting affidavit were 
submitted on the issue of reasonableness and the trial court failed to hold an 
evidentiary hearing to resolve those conflicts; and (4) an award of fees to obtain fees 
does not fall within the scope of Rule 65A. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ORIGINAL INJUNCTION IN THIS CASE WAS A FINAL JUDGMENT, ISSUED PURSUANT 
TO RULES 12(c) AND 54(C), AND NOT A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, ISSUED UNDER 
RULE 65A; THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO RULE 65A Is THEREFORE 
ERRONEOUS AND MUST BE REVERSED. 
"The traditional American rule, and the rule in Utah, is that attorney fees are not 
recoverable by a prevailing party unless authorized by statute or contract." Faust v. KAI 
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Tech., Inc., 2000 UT 82, H 17, 15 P.3d 1266. There is no statute or contract in this 
case on which the trial court relied in awarding fees in this case. 
Apparently recognizing that no statute or contract would allow them their fees 
herein, Interveners sought a fee award pursuant to, and the trial court ultimately 
awarded fees under, the rule governing fee awards for dissolving wrongful preliminary 
injunctions, UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c)(2). Interveners ignored the actual procedural 
posture of the case, that a final judgment had entered on Medisys' Rule 12(c) motion 
for judgment on the pleadings. 
Interveners substituted a strawman premise for the actual procedural posture of 
the case, by citing Rule 65A in their original memorandum supporting their emergency 
motion to "dissolve" the permanent injunction, by arguing: "Article 8 nowhere permitted 
an injunction against Interveners, [footnote omitted] Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65A 
thus governs this case." R. 131. There is no logical link between the strawman (and 
incorrect) premise that Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code "nowhere permitted 
an injunction against Interveners" and Interveners' sole supposed conclusion that "Rule 
65A thus governs this case." 
The plain language of Rule 65A deals with preliminary relief, not permanent 
injunctions entered upon the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). Rule 65A does not 
govern cases, it provides an interim remedy before the court reaches the ultimate 
merits of cases. The procedural posture of this case is governed instead by Rule 12(c) 
and 54(c), because the trial court did reach the ultimate merits when it ruled on 
Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(c). 
Interveners complained that Medisys and its transfer agent agreed that the 
11 
injunction should issue against the transfer agent to protect it from liability under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, because Interveners were affected in their ability to trade 
shares publically by the injunction against the transfer agent. The fact that Interveners 
characterized this lawsuit, prior to their intervention, as a "sham" did not serve to alter 
the case's actual procedural posture, as entailing a judgment entered pursuant to Rule 
12(c). Nor could Interveners' characterizations, or their expressions of outrage, engage 
Rule 65A, governing preliminary injunctive relief, so as to provide a basis in that 
procedural rule for an award of fees, when no party had invoked that rule and the trial 
court did not provide interim relief pursuant to that rule. 
Whatever remedies Interveners' may seek elsewhere, for whatever claims they 
believe they have for wrongful injunction and damages, including fees to set it aside, in 
whatever other forums they choose, the procedure invoked in this forum did not entail 
any preliminary injunction under Rule 65A and Rule 65A does not govern a fee award, 
here or elsewhere. Instead, an injunction was obtained on the merits, pursuant to Rule 
12(c). The trial court's award of fees under Rule 65A must, therefore, be reversed, and 
the Interveners left to pursue their remedies in another forum. 
II. EVEN IF RULE 65A WERE APPLICABLE, THE FEE AWARD Is ERRONEOUS. 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A provides the procedural framework, grounds for, and 
conditions under which temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions may be 
issued. One such condition is that, when a party is wrongfully enjoined, he may recover 
his "costs, including reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the restraining 
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order or preliminary injunction . . . . " UTAH R. CIV. P. 65A(c)(2). A party who has been 
wrongfully enjoined by way of a preliminary injunction issued pursuant to UTAH CIV. P. 
65A may recover the attorney fees it reasonably "Incurred in defending against [the] 
wrongfully obtained injunctive relief."' Tholen v. Sandy City, 849 P .2d 592, 597 (Utah 
App. 1993) (citations omitted). 
First, Interveners were not a party when the injunction issued, and were not 
actually "restrained or enjoined" themselves, as Rule 65A(c)(2) requires. The injunction 
prevented the transfer agent, Interstate Transfer, from registering transfers of certain 
certificates. The shares owned by the Interveners could still be sold by them. If 
Interveners prevailed in their collateral litigation with Medisys, or obtained appropriate 
interim relief in that litigation, Medisys, as the issuer of the shares, could have been 
required to order its transfer agent to register the transfer. Interveners thus do not have 
standing under the language of Rule 65A to seek a fee award. See M.P.G. 
Construction, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, So.2d , No. 2003 CA 0164, 
2004 WL 691511, at *5 ("Based upon our review of the record in this matter and the 
language of the aforementioned statute, we note that based upon its status as an 
intervenor in this litigation, Certified Coatings lacks status to assert a claim for costs and 
attorney fees.") (La. Ct. App. April 2, 2004). Since Interveners were not a "party" who 
was "restrained or enjoined" they have no standing under the rule to recover their fees, 
regardless of the indirect impact of the injunction on them. 
Second, most, if not all, of the fees awarded would have been incurred in the 
underlying litigation, so are not awardable under Rule 65A. In Ikon Office Solutions, 
Inc. v. Crook, 2000 UT App. 217, 6 P.3d 1143, this Court plainly held that "the trial court 
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should not award . .. any fees that. . . would have [been] incurred in litigating the 
underlying case, even if those fees were incurred in [an effort] to show that [plaintiff] 
was unlikely to prevail on the merits of the underlying claim." 2000 UT App. 217, U 22, 
6 P.3d at 1149. The trial court failed to make any findings in this regard, and that failure 
necessitates a reversal at least for the purpose of requiring findings as to what fees 
might be awardable. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 52(a) (mandating findings of fact where 
actions tried to the court). 
Third, the trial court had in front of it affidavit evidence that controverted the 
affidavits proffered by Interveners as to the reasonableness of the sought-after fee 
award. In essence, the trial court entered a ruling under Rule 56, granting summary 
judgment on the reasonableness issue. Rule 56 does not allow such a factual 
determination to be made where conflicting affidavits raise a genuine issue of material 
fact, as they do here. "A trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed 
for correctness." Snow v. Rudd, 998 P.2d 262, 265, 2000 UT 20, U 9. "Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." SME Industries, Inc. v. 
Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback, and Assoc, Inc., 28 P.3d 669, 673, 2001 UT 54, U 9 
(citing UTAH R. CIV. P. 56(c)). "Doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of 
fact must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment. Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the court before 
judgment can be rendered against them unless it is obvious from the evidence before 
the court that the party opposing judgment can establish no right to recovery. The trial 
court must not weigh evidence or assess credibility." Mountain States Telephone & 
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Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) 
(footnotes omitted). The Affidavit of Michael D. Ward goes over, in detail, numerous 
double charges and excessive billings that preclude a finding of reasonableness. R. 
437-441. The Affidavit of John T. Anderson, likewise opines as to the 
unreasonableness of sought-after fees, in detail. R. 514-18. The trial court's weighing 
of the affidavits was improper, and it should have held an evidentiary hearing to resolve 
the conflicting factual assertions as to the reasonableness and necessity of the fees. 
The failure to hold such an evidentiary hearing and the entry of summary judgment in 
the face of conflicting affidavits is reversible error. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ADDITIONAL FEES AND EXPENSES. 
The Interveners were not entitled to any additional fee award sought in their 
Motion for Clarification of Fee Award for several reasons. First, all these additional fees 
were incurred in connection with seeking a fee award. Such fees are not compensable 
under Rule 65A because they were not incurred in obtaining dissolution of the 
injunction. 
A. The Interveners Should Not Be Awarded Any Fees Incurred in 
Preparing or Arguing their Motion for Fees. 
The Interveners "are only entitled to "fees . .. incurred in defending against 
wrongfully obtained injunctive relief.'" Tholen, 849 P.2d at 597. All of the additional 
sums the Interveners sought were incurred in attempting to secure a fee award, not in 
defending against or obtaining dissolution of the injunction. Accordingly, the fees cannot 
be properly awarded under Rule 65A and the Interveners' motion for clarification should 
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be denied. 
B. The Trial Court Erred When It Granted the Interveners' Request for 
Additional Fees Because the Number of Hours Claimed for Preparing 
and Arguing Their Fee Application Is Patently Unreasonable. 
The additional fees for obtaining fees that Interveners sought were patently 
unreasonable. Including amounts already awarded by the trial court, the Interveners 
claimed a total of $16,172.54 in fees and expenses relating solely to their efforts to 
obtain a fee award. Even if such fees could be recovered under Rule 65A, the amount 
of such fees claimed by Interveners in this case was unreasonably high, especially 
when the amount of claimed fees is considered against the relative brevity of the 
hearing on the Interveners' fee application. (See Anderson Affidavit R. 514-18.) 
C. The Trial Court Erred In Granting The Interveners' Request for 
Additional Fees Because Such Fees were Unnecessarily Incurred. 
The Interveners' local counsel, Mr. Dykes, shouldered the responsibility for 
drafting the Interveners' motion for fees and supporting memoranda and also argued 
the matter. Mr. Dykes was more than competent to handle the fee request. 
Nonetheless, in addition to the fees relating to Mr. Dykes efforts in this regard, the 
Interveners sought approximately $11,000 for the unnecessary efforts of their Florida 
counsel. There was no need for Mr. Spencer to prepare for the one hour hearing on the 
motion for attorney fees or to travel to Utah to attend the hearing. Accordingly, the 
Court should not have awarded any fees for the time and expenses of Mr. Spencer 
relating to the motion for fees for obtaining fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in awarding fees to the Interveners pursuant to Rule 65A. 
Moreover, even should this Court find that the trial court did not err in granting the 
Interveners motion for an award of fees, the amount actually awarded was 
unreasonable in the circumstances and not available under Rule 65A as going to the 
underlying merits. 
For these reasons, the order of the trial court awarding fees should be reversed 
and the matter remanded with instructions that no fees may be awarded in this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^( f f indav of May, 2004. 
PETERS SCOFIELD PRICE 
A Professional Corporation 
DAVID W. SCOFIELD 
Attorneys for the Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Appellants' Opening Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, this /)Jrrx 
day of May, 2004, to the following: 
Mark W. Dykes 
LEBOEF, LAMB GREENE & MACRAE 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
John Michael Coombs 
MABEY & COOMBS, L.C. 
3098 S. Highland Drive, Suite 323 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-3085 
David W. Scofield 
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APPENDIX 1 
ORDER PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY: 
Lon A. Jenkins #4060 
Mark W. Dykes, #5067 
Attorneys for Defendants in Intervention 
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE, L.L.P. 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 320-6700 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER CO., ] 
Defendants. ] 
) Civil No.: 000904474 
) Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
) [PROPOSED] 
) ORDER GRANTING INTERVENERS' 
) MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF FEES 
On January 19, 2001, the Court heard oral argument on the following motions: 
1. The motion of Medisys Technologies, Inc. ("Medisys") for an order releasing the 
injunction bond posted in this matter, and 
2. The motion of intervening defendants Brett Phillips, E. Carl Anderson, William 
H. Morris, Marilyn Morris, and Barbara Larkins ("Interveners") for an award of attorneys' fees. 
Medisys was represented by Michael D. Ward and Richard J. Leedy. The Interveners 
were represented by Thomas E. Spencer and Mark W. Dykes. Interstate Transfer Company, the 
defendant, did not appear. 
FILED DISTRICT C0HIT 
Third Judicial Dlttrlot 
FEB 1 2 2001 
SALT WKE COUNTY , 
9
 ^W hpt«d" 
Having considered the parties' written submissions and oral arguments, the Court hereby 
finds and orders as follows: 
1 For reasons set forth during the Court's oral ruling on January 19, 2001, the 
Interveners' motion for fees was timely filed. 
2. For reasons set forth during the Court's oral ruling on January 19, 2001, the 
injunction entered in this case was wrongful under Utah R.Civ.P. 65A, and the Interveners' 
motion for attorneys' fees is granted. 
3. Within 10 days of January 19, 2001, Medisys may file an objection to the amount 
of fees requested by the Interveners. Medisys may request in such objection, if one is filed, an 
evidentiary hearing on the reasonableness of the fees requested. 
4. The motion of Medisys to release the bond is denied. 
DATED this & day of fjZfrfMJUi/&Ql 
BY THE COURT: 
Ronald ETNe! 
Third Judicial 
Ms~i 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the day of February, 2001, copies of the foregoing Proposed Order 
were served by placing them in the United States mails, postage paid, addressed to the following: 
John Michael Coombs 
124 South 600 East, #100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Richard J. Leedy 
44 West Third South, #703 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Michael D. Ward 
Worsfold, MacFarland, McDonald, PLLC 
5940 Tahoe Drive, SE, Suite 200 
Grand Rapids, MI 49545 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT \ 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LA* 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER CO,, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 000904474 
Intervener's Motion for Award of Fees was presented to me for 
decision pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed on March 8, 2001. I 
have previously determined that the intervenor is entitled to an 
award of attorney's fees in connection with its defense of the 
above-captioned action for injunctive relief. I now find that the 
amount of attorney's fees sought by the intervenor, $3 0,846, is 
reasonable in light of the complexity of the litigation. I further 
find the hourly rates charged by intervener's counsel to be 
reasonable. I reject plaintiff's contention that the activities of 
Mr. Dykes and Mr. Spencer were excessive in light of the issues 
presented. Lastly, I reject the contention that the fee 
application was inflated by double billing. 
svi 
MEDISYS TECH. V. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
Intervenor's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry. 
Dated this ^ day of 44arcfc, 2001. 
RONALD E. NEHRING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
5"!>0 
MEDISYS TECH. V. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER PAGE 3 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this day of March, 
2001: 
Richard J. Leedy 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
44 West 300 South, Suite 703 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael D. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
594 0 Tahoe Drive, SE, Suite 200 
Grand Rapids, Michigan 4 9545 
John Michael Coombs 
Attorney for Defendant 
124 South 600 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Lon A. Jenkins 
Mark W. Dykes 
Attorney for Defendants in Intervention 
136 S. Main, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Thomas E. Spencer 
19235 U.S. Highway 41 North 
Lutz, Florida 33519 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT w % 
IK AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER CO., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 000904474 
Intervenor's Motion for Clarification was presented to me for 
decision pursuant to a Notice to Submit filed on May 10, 2001. My 
review of the file confirms the intervener's observation that I 
overlooked the intervener's application for fees associated with 
intervener's application for a fee award. I reject the argument 
advanced by Medisys that Rule 65A does not authorize fee awards of 
this nature. I decline, however, to award fees associated with 
travel time and travel expenses. 
I decline to accept Medisys' invitation to revisit my original 
fee determination. 
Intervener's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry. 
Dated this fo day of June, 2001. 
Jr^/U^Ud 
RONALD E. NEHRI 
DISTRICT COURT 
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MEDISYS TECH. V. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILINQ CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this \\) day of June, 
2001: 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Matthew M. Boley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael D. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5940 Tahoe Drive, SE, Suite 200 
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49545 
John Michael Coombs 
Attorney for Defendant 
124 South 600 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Lon A. Jenkins 
Mark W. Dykes 
Attorney for Defendants in Intervention 
136 S. Main, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
APPENDIX 4 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER CO., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 
*»* Judical o/sww 
. j uw : 8 raw 
SALT LAK£ COLWY^ 
Deputy c/erk 
Intervener's Motion for Clarification was presented to me for 
decision pursuant to a Notice to Submit fdled on May 10, 2001. My 
review of the file confirms the intervener's observation that I 
overlooked the intervener's application for fees associated with 
intervener's application for a fee award. I reject the argument 
advanced by Medisys that Rule 65A does not authorize fee awards of 
this nature. I decline, however, to award fees associated with 
travel time and travel expenses. 
I decline to accept Medisys1 invitation to revisit my original 
fee determination. 
Intervener's counsel shall prepare an Order consistent with 
this Minute Entry. *^,joONT*" 
_day of June, 200aJ^2
-
^/v /^( Dated t h i s i& 
T JDDGE ^gitf^ 
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MEDISYS TECH. V. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER PAGE 2 MINUTE ENTRY 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this \n . day of June, 
2001: 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Matthew M. Boley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Michael D. Ward 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5940 Tahoe Drive, SE, Suite 200 
Grand Rapids, Michigan 49545 
John Michael Coombs 
Attorney for Defendant 
124 South 600 East, Suite 3 00 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Lon A. Jenkins 
Mark W. Dykes 
Attorney for Defendants in Intervention 
136 S. Main, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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APPENDIX 5 
PROPOSED ORDER PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY: 
Lon A. Jenkins #4060 
Mark W. Dykes, #5067 
Attorneys for Defendants in Intervention 
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE, L.L.P. 
1000 Keams Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 320-6700 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FILER MOTMGT WMl 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 5- M 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER CO., 
Defendants. 
Civil No.: 000904474 
Judge Ronald E. Nehring 
fPROPO0ED> ORDER 
CLARIFYING MINUTE 
RULING AND AWARDING FEES 
On April 2, 2001, this Court issued its minute ruling granting Interveners an award of 
$30,846.00 in fees incurred by the Interveners in responding to the injunction issued in this 
matter. The Interveners then filed a motion to clarify whether the Court intended to deny 
recovery of those sums expended by the Interveners in connection with the fee motion itself. 
The Court subsequently clarified that it would award fees expended by the Interveners on 
the fee motion, but would not award fees for travel and travel related expenses incurred in 
connection with the fee motion. 
Therefore, based upon the affidavits and memorandum submitted by counsel for 
Interveners and the records of this case, it is hereby ORDERED that Medisys, Inc. shall pay the 
Interveners the sum of $36,321.80. 
S3! 
$&i This amo'tml &hdMji paid [by/within] *_ 
DATED this £_ day o f ^ f r i u M t V - " , 209*9" 
BY THE COURT 
Hon. Ronald 
Third Judicial 
55* 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Pursuant to Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 4-504(2), I certify that on the 21st 
day of November, 2001, copies of the foregoing were served by placing them in the United States 
mails, postage paid, addressed to the following: 
John Michael Coombs 
Mabey & Coombs, L.C. 
Highland Park Plaza 
3098 South Highland Drive, Suite 323 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Bryon J. Benevento 
Matthew M. Boley 
Snell & Wilmer 
15 West South Temple, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Michael D. Ward 
Worsfold, MacFarland, McDonald, PLLC 
5940 Tahoe Drive, SE, Suite 200 
Grand Rapids, MI 49545 
3 
APPENDIX 6 
Order submitted and prepared by: 
Mark W. Dykes (Utah Bar No. 5709) 
Jennifer A. Brown (Utah Bar No. 9514) 
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE, L.L.P 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801)320-6700 
Facsimile: (801) 359-8256 
Attorneys for Appellees 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
MEDISYS TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INTERSTATE TRANSFER CO., 
Defendant, 
and 
Brett Phillips, E. Carl Anderson, William H. 
Morris, Marilyn Morris, and Barbara Larkins, 
Intervening Defendants . 
The Motion of the Intervening Defendants ("Intervenors") to Dismiss the Action 
with Prejudice came before the Court for hearing on October 8, 2003 at 8:30 a.m. David W. 
Scofield of Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters, P.C. appeared on behalf of the Defendant. 
Mark W. Dykes and Jennifer A. Brown of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, L.L.P. appeared 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
DL 'J 1J03 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
Civil No.: 000904474 
ORDER DISMISSING 
CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
on behalf of Intervenors. Having considered the parties' memoranda and oral arguments, the 
Court hereby ORDERS: 
1. The Motion of the Intervenors to Dismiss the Action with Prejudice is hereby 
denied, to the extent it requests dismissal with prejudice. 
2. The action is hereby dismissed without prejudice, on the grounds that there is a 
concurrent pending action in the United States District Court for the District of Utah involving 
similar parties and claims. 
DATED thig/ day ofNovcmbw, 2003 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Dismissing Action without Prejudice 
was served via U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, fhis / -^_ day of November, 2003, 
addressed to the following: 
David W. Scofield 
Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn & Peters, P.C. 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Michael D. Ward 
Bleakley, Cypher, Parent, Warrant & Quinn, P.C. 
50 Monroe Place, Suite 700 East 
Grand Rapids, MI 49503 
John Michael Coombs 
Mabey & Coombs, L.C. 
3098 S. Highland Drive, Suite 323 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106-3085 
'fC^C^ Cf^^ 
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